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Introduction and background context
1. The long-running Chagos litigation has now entered into its third decade1 with the
Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Hoareau and Bancoult) v Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.2 The appeal was brought by Ms Solange
Hoareau and Mr Louis Olivier Bancoult to challenge the Divisional Court’s earlier judg-
ment.3 The appeal concerns a decision taken at the very highest level of government in
2016, which was to refuse to support the resettlement of the Chagossians to the British
Indian Ocean Territory (‘the BIOT’).4 The Chagossians had originally been the inhabi-
tants of the BIOT and many still wish to return to the outer islands of the Chagos Archi-
pelago.5 Rather than supporting resettlement, the UK government offered the
Chagossians about £40 million in compensation over the course of 10 years. The
appeal was heard in May 2020 by Sir Terence Etherton MR, Green LJ and Dingemans
LJ, and judgment was handed down on 30 July 2020.
2. The BIOT, which encompasses the Chagos Archipelago and is also known as the
Chagos Islands, was previously part of the British colony of Mauritius, until it was
detached from Mauritius in November 1965 to create a new territory.6 The rationale
for the detachment was to facilitate the use of the Chagos Archipelago as a military
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1Mr Bancoult first began legal proceedings in 1998. However, note the previous Vencatessen litigation which resulted in a
settlement in the 1980s, with the UK government agreeing to provide additional compensation to the Chagossians.
2[2020] EWCA Civ 1010, [2021] 1 WLR 472.
3R (Hoareau and Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 221 (Admin), [2019] 1 WLR
4105.
4Hoareau and Bancoult (n 2) [1].
5These would not include the largest island in the BIOT, Diego Garcia, as it is the location of a joint UK and US military base.
6As a result of the Lancaster House agreement the representatives of the then non-independent Mauritius agreed to its detach-
ment in return for compensation. Post-independence Mauritius has challenged the legitimacy of the detachment. For com-
mentary on the international law dimension to the litigation see S Allen, The Chagos Islanders and International Law (Hart
Publishing 2014); S Allen and C Monaghan (eds), Fifty Years of the British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal Perspectives (Springer
2018); and T Burri and J Trinidad (eds), The International Court of Justice and Decolonization: New Directions from the Chagos
Advisory Opinion (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
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base by the US. In consequence, the Chagossians were removed from the BIOT by the
UK in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
3. The UK government has apologised for its treatment of the Chagossians, for instance in
2018 in oral pleadings before the International Court of Justice in Legal Consequences
of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. The then Solicitor
General, Robert Buckland QC, had informed the International Court of Justice that,
‘the United Kingdom… fully accepts that the manner in which the Chagossians
were removed from the Chagos Archipelago, and the way they were treated thereafter,
was shameful and wrong, and it deeply regrets that fact’.7
4. In light of the extent of the previous litigation and its inherent complexity, it is not
possible to provide a full account of its history, other than to give a broad chronology.
Previously in 2000, Mr Bancoult had successfully challenged the original Immigration
Ordinance 1971 that had removed the Chagossians’ right to live on the islands.8 In
response to the decision of the Divisional Court, the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs had agreed not to introduce new colonial legislation to
restrict the right of abode. However, in 2004 two new Orders in Council were intro-
duced that did just this, and these orders were challenged by Mr Bancoult. Despite
being successful before the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal, Mr Bancoult was ulti-
mately unsuccessful before the House of Lords.9
5. The present appeal was heard in the context of the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice, which found that the UK, by its detachment of the Chagos Archipelago,
had not completed the decolonisation of Mauritius. Therefore, the court advised that the
UK should return the territory to Mauritius. The UK government has been keen to empha-
sise inter alia that the decision is only advisory and not binding. However, the subsequent
Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly inMay 2019 instructed theUK to ‘with-
draw its colonial administration from the Chagos Archipelago unconditionally within a
periodof nomore than sixmonths’.10 Todate theUKhas not compliedwith the Resolution.
The three issues to be determined
6. There were three issues to the appeal relating to, first, whether as a result of the Advi-
sory Opinion and the UN Resolution, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) now extended to the BIOT; second, whether the Divisional Court or the original
decision maker need to apply anxious scrutiny because of the importance of the right
of abode; and, third, whether the decision was irrational for a number of reasons.11
7Oral Pleadings, 3 September 2018.
8R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (No. 1) [2000] EWHC 413 (Admin).
9R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61.
10For commentary see ‘General Assembly Welcomes International Court of Justice Opinion on Chagos Archipelago, Adopts Text
Calling for Mauritius’ Complete Decolonization’, United Nations, 22 May 2019, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12146.
doc.htm> accessed 22 September 2020.
11Hoareau and Bancoult (n 2) [92].
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7. The first issue concerned whether the ECHR extended to the Chagos Islands and, if it
did, whether there had been breach of Art 8 and Art 1 of the First Protocol. The appel-
lants argued that despite the decision in Chagos Islanders v UK,12 ‘that had the ECtHR
been aware of the Advisory Opinion and the UN Resolution then it would have taken,
and been bound to take, a quite different approach’ as the UK no longer lawfully had
responsibility for the international relations of the BIOT.13
8. The Court of Appeal rejected the appellants’ submissions in relation to the first issue,
concluding that ‘whilst recognising that there was a human right relating to resettle-
ment, neither the Advisory Opinion nor the UN Resolution actually decided anything
about that right’, and although the UK is urged to co-operate with Mauritius on reset-
tlement, the issue was part of decolonisation and even Mauritius was placed under no
obligation to resettle the islands.14 Furthermore, resettlement and decolonisation
were not the same thing, and the Advisory Opinion was decided on the grounds of
the incomplete decolonisation of Mauritius.15 The final, ‘and perhaps most’ fundamen-
tal reason for rejecting the argument, was that ‘neither the Advisory Opinion nor the
UN Resolution support the proposition that the UK does not have responsibility for the
foreign relations of the BIOT, at least pending full decolonisation’ (emphasis in orig-
inal).16 Therefore, the UK’s actions in relation to the BIOT were lawful, as the Advisory
Opinion’s remedy was designed to be prospective and not retrospective.17
9. This is extremely important, since had the Court of Appeal been willing to accept that
the correct interpretation of the Advisory Opinion and Resolution was that the UK did
not actually, as a matter of international law, have responsibility for the foreign
relations of the BIOT, then this would have the result of bypassing the obstacle
posed by Art 56 ECHR (as the ‘colonial clause’ is reliant on the decision not to
extend the ECHR being taken by a state that is responsible for that territory’s inter-
national relations).18 The Court of Appeal was clear that ‘Article 56 applies and
Article 1 is excluded’.19 Even if the Court of Appeal had been free to find that the
common law right of abode had been enlarged by the application of the ECHR to
the BIOT, the 2004 Orders in Council prevented the Chagossians from returning and
the legality of these had been upheld in Bancoult (No. 2)20 by a majority of the
House of Lords.21
12App no 35622/04 (2012).





18For a more detailed consideration of Arts 1 and 56 ECHR and the BIOT see R Wilde, ‘“Anachronistic As Colonial Remnants May
Be…” Locating the Rights of the Chagos Islanders As a Case Study of the Operation of Human Rights Law in Colonial Ter-
ritories’ in S Allen and C Monaghan (eds), Fifty Years of the British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal Perspectives (Springer 2018).
19Hoareau and Bancoult (n 2) [139].
20Bancoult (No. 2) (n 9).
21Hoareau and Bancoult (n 2) [143]–[144].
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10. The second issue involved an interesting consideration of whether both the decision
maker and the Divisional Court had needed to apply anxious scrutiny when reaching
their decisions. The Court of Appeal referred to Sir Thomas BinghamMR in R v Ministry
of Defence ex p. Smith,22 where BinghamMR had stated that when deciding whether a
decision was rational, the courts should apply more scrutiny to a decision that
involves human rights.23 However, the Court of Appeal also observed that Sir
Thomas Bingham MR had been clear that the court must not be too willing to
hold a decision to be irrational. This was because when deciding whether or not a
certain policy was rational, then depending on the nature of the decision this was
essentially a question of institutional competency.24 The Court of Appeal held that
the Divisional Court was correct in not applying anxious scrutiny when reaching its
decision as ‘this was not a decision which should be subjected to “anxious scrutiny”
… because there was no “interference with human rights”’.25 The Court of Appeal
observed that although the removal and loss of right of abode had been wrongful,
compensation had been offered.26
11. The Court of Appeal was clear that the appeal had been wrong to focus on the need
for the decision to only concern human rights before anxious scrutiny could be
applied, as a court could ‘consider a matter closely if it raises issues of real important
to individual’ and importantly ‘[t]he Courts do not maintain any rigid classification or
taxonomy of rights which is then used to govern the intensity of the scrutiny’.27
Despite recognising respective institutional competence, i.e. the executive may be
best placed to take certain types of decisions, the Court of Appeal was clear that ‘it
remains the constitutional duty of the court to ensure that the decision is lawful.
The fact that the decision is in an area where the decision maker might be best
placed to make the assessment is not a bar to a finding of irrationality’.28
12. This is important point for public law practitioners, especially those whose clients are
seeking to challenge a government decision that concerns a balanced policy decision
where there is no engagement with human rights. It should be noted that the dom-
estic courts have never accepted that the ongoing Chagos litigation involved any
human rights issues in the form of the ECHR. Here the overt willingness of the
Court of Appeal to reiterate its constitutional duty is important, especially now








29See ‘Government launches independent panel to look at judicial review’ Gov.UK, 31 July 2020 <https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/government-launches-independent-panel-to-look-at-judicial-review> accessed 22 September 2020; M
Elliott, ‘The Judicial Review Review I: The Reform Agenda and its Potential Scope’, Public Law for Everyone, 3 August 2020
<https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/08/03/the-judicial-review-review-i-the-reform-agenda-and-its-potential-scope/>
accessed 22 September 2020.
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13. The Court of Appeal then considered, although it stated that it was not necessary to
do so, whether the decision maker had to also apply anxious scrutiny when making a
decision that concerned a human rights context.30 The court rejected the proposition
that this was the correct approach, but observed that the more important a decision
then the more care a decision maker would ‘likely… be required’ to take.31 Applying
this to the present appeal, the Court of Appeal observed that the decision in question
was ‘taken with conspicuous care and consideration’.32
14. The third issue before the Court of Appeal involved the rationality of the government’s
2016 decision not to support the resettlement of theouter islanders in the ChagosArchi-
pelago. The appellants had argued that the Chagossians’ right of return needed to have
been ‘considered separately from issues of resettlement’, that there were also three
material misdescriptions: the first about ‘about the feasibility of constructing a
runway’, the second ‘about the deliverability of the financial package’, and the third con-
cerninghow thepackagehadbeen calculated.33 TheCourt ofAppeal rejected the appel-
lants’ submissions, finding that the government had acted rationally. On the point of
resettlement, the Court of Appeal observed the government had acted rationally in con-
sidering resettlement and the right of return, as any feasible return by the islanders
would in reality be reliant on a government resettlement package.34
Conclusion
15. The appellants’ arguments were strong and had made a very sound case for challen-
ging the 2016 decision. However, perhaps it was not surprising that the Court of
Appeal reached the conclusions it did on the first issue; especially, in light of the
ECHR jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights35 and the manner in
which the Court of Appeal interpreted the nature of the Advisory Opinion and the
Resolution of the UN General Assembly. This in turn in part explains the outcome
for the second issue, as to whether the Divisional Court should have applied
anxious scrutiny when reviewing the 2016 decision, although the Court of Appeal’s
commentary on the scope of the test for anxious scrutiny is of considerable impor-
tance for future public law litigation.
16. The decision of the Supreme Court as to whether it will hear an appeal from the
appellants remains to be determined. If an appeal is granted then it will be interesting
to see whether the Supreme Court reaches a different decision on the basis of the
applicability of the ECHR, the need for anxious scrutiny, and the rationality of the
decision.





35See Chagos Islanders v UK (n 12) and Al-Skeini and others v UK App no 55721/07 (2011).
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17. In light of the growing international pressure on the UK to return the Chagos Archi-
pelago to Mauritius and complete the decolonisation of its former colony, it is likely
that a future UK government might, subject to US agreement and assurances from
Mauritius as to the future of the military base on Diego Garcia, concede that sover-
eignty rests with Mauritius. In that case, the question of the right of abode and reset-
tlement is a matter to be determined by Mauritius and not the UK.
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